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Risk, Human Rights and the Management of a Serious Sex Of-
fender∗ 
Noel Whitty 
Abstract: Risk and human rights discourses have become dominant features of the UK criminal justice arena. 
However, there has been little critical scrutiny of the ways in which these discourses relate to each other. In this article, 
I focus on different accounts of the case of Anthony Rice, a 48-year old ex-offender who committed a murder in 
August 2005 whilst under the joint supervision of English probation and police services. Drawing upon official 
reviews by the Inspectorate of Probation and the UK Parliament Joint Committee on Human Rights, as well as 
media coverage, I use the Rice case to problematise some common assumptions about the relationship between risk and 
human rights.  
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Introduction: The Rice case   
On 17 August 2005, a 40-year old woman, Naomi Bryant was murdered at her home in 
Hampshire, England. Her attacker, Anthony Rice, had been freed from prison in No-
vember 2004 after serving 15 years of a ‘discretionary life sentence’ for an attempted rape. 
Upon his release, he was subject to supervision by Hampshire Police and Hampshire 
Probation Service under what is termed Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements 
(MAPPA). Formally established by legislation in 2000, this inter-agency system for risk 
management of serious violent and sex offenders in England and Wales requires local 
Multi-Agency Public Protection Panels (MAPPP) to convene, share all relevant informa-
tion, and monitor individual risk assessment and management plans for the most serious 
offenders resettling in their area (Kemshall et al. 2005).1 At the time of the murder, under 
the terms of his MAPPP management plan, Rice was classified as at ‘high risk’ of re-
offending and was residing under curfew and other conditions at a charity-run hostel. In 
October 2005, after Rice was convicted of the Bryant murder and sentenced to a mini-
mum of 25 years imprisonment, an official inquiry was launched by the Inspectorate of 
Probation into the failures in the system of supervision in Rice’s case.    
The Inspectorate’s Report, published in May 2006, identified a ‘cumulative failure’ in 
the management of Rice while he was in prison and also after release. It highlighted a 
 
 
∗   My thanks to Thérèse Murphy, Susanne Karstedt and Bettina Lange for their helpful com-
ments. 
1  In 2005-06, there was a total of 47,653 MAPPA offenders in the community, out of which 
1278 (3%) required the highest Level 3 form of MAPPP supervision (see generally Wood 
2006).  
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series of ‘mistakes, misjudgements and miscommunications’ (2006: 2) by all the main 
actors involved with the case – including different prison staff, psychologists, Parole 
Board members, probation staff and police officers. In particular, the Inspectorate noted 
(a) the general failure to take account of Rice’s previous sexual offences against children 
in the 1970s; (b) inadequate risk assessment processes and record-keeping; (c) the insuffi-
cient evidence before the Parole Board when it decided that Rice be moved to open 
prison conditions in 2002 and then released under supervision in 2004; (d) the lack of 
effective communication between the relevant MAPPA actors; and (e) the insufficient 
monitoring by probation and police of Rice’s compliance with the conditions of his re-
lease (for example, the ban on alcohol usage and association with lone women). 
Throughout the Report, the Inspectorate also drew specific attention to what it identified 
as a key factor in the incorrect management of the public risk posed by Anthony Rice – 
‘human rights considerations’: 
It was also from 2001 that in our view the people managing this case started to allow its public 
protection considerations to be undermined by its human rights considerations, as these re-
quired increasing attention from all involved, especially as the prisoner was legally represented 
(2006: 5).  
Subsequent media coverage, and official commentary, focused almost exclusively on the 
alleged causal role of the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998 in the death of Naomi Bryant. 
Most notably, the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, cited the Bryant murder as part of his gen-
eral attack on the alleged effects of European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
jurisprudence on UK law and pledged to ensure that ‘the law-abiding majority can live 
without fear’ (Observer, 14 May 2006). More specifically, the Secretary of State for Consti-
tutional Affairs asserted that the Parole Board and Probation Service ‘were concerned 
about legal action against them on human rights grounds … In [the Rice] case they came 
to the wrong conclusion, and prioritised his right to liberty over public protection’ (Fal-
coner 2007). As a result of the ensuing political controversy, the UK Parliament Joint 
Committee on Human Rights conducted its own investigation into the Rice case. It flatly 
rejected the official version of events and found that there was no factual evidence of a 
‘clear causal connection between any interpretation or application of the HRA [1998] and 
the death of Naomi Bryant’ (JCHR 2006: 15). Instead, it directly condemned government 
ministers for actively encouraging public misperceptions about the Human Rights Act 
and for using rights discourse as ‘a convenient scapegoat for unrelated administrative 
failings within Government’. It also claimed that the Inspectorate’s Report was ‘the prod-
uct of a misunderstanding of the HRA’ because it maintained:  
a dubious antithesis between human rights considerations and public protection considerations, 
which does not acknowledge that, properly understood, public protection forms a crucial part of 
an overall human rights perspective in cases such as those of Anthony Rice (JCHR 2006: 16). 
In this article, I use the Rice case to analyse risk and human rights discourses in the con-
text of sex offender management. These discourses tend to be represented in oppositional 
terms. UK legal and criminological scholarship help to constitute and reinforce this fram-
ing: for the most part, risk discourses have been used by criminologists and not by law-
yers; equally, although human rights has featured prominently in the work of lawyers, it is 
rarely discussed in criminology. My aim is to highlight the need for a combined ‘risk and 
Risk, Human Rights and the Management of a Serious Sex Offender 203 
 
 
rights’ stream of academic enquiry which acknowledges the co-existence of different  risk 
and rights discourses (Murphy and Whitty 2007; Sparks 2001).  
Specifically, I argue for the recognition of different types of risk and rights knowl-
edges, and of the fact that these operate in different institutional and cultural settings, and 
can overlap in unpredictable ways. I draw upon the following three themes to analyse 
characteristics of the Rice case: (1) the social construction of risk in offender manage-
ment; (2) how organisations ‘frame’ questions of risk and rights compliance; and (3) the 
diversity of understandings and representations of ‘human rights’.   
The Social Construction of Risk in Offender Management 
Practices of risk assessment are most often represented as requiring expert scientific 
processes of judgement. As Lupton has highlighted, techno-scientific approaches aim to 
identify, map, predict and regulate different types of risk according to allegedly objective 
criteria, and do not acknowledge the influence of socio-political choice on the technolo-
gies of risk (1999: 2). In contrast, critical scholarship on risk has argued for analyses that 
recognise the variability of risk technologies and knowledges (for example, in relation to 
gender (Hannah-Moffat 2005)), as well as how different risks are socially constructed 
(e.g., Mythen and Walklate 2006; Levi 2000). Sparks, furthermore, has argued for particu-
lar scrutiny of the ‘ways in which risks are communicated and how they are politicised’ (2000: 
132). In the criminal justice arena, and especially in relation to the MAPPA framework, 
the impact of risk-based thinking has been especially significant. However, as Kemshall 
has argued, the ‘use of subjective and professional judgements alongside of, and at times, 
in place of actuarial tools’ remains, as well as the continued ‘role of professional values 
and occupational culture in risk practice’ (2003: 96). For example, the foregrounding of 
even apparently ‘rational’ criteria (such as statistical correlations or previous convictions) 
may be very misleading as to the actual nature of risk governance. First, as Moore and 
Valverde point out, the apparent privileging of expert knowledges and quantifiable for-
mats does not mean that ‘myths, symbols and non-rational fears’ may not also shape the 
construction of certain ‘risks’ (2000: 515). Secondly, the aura of expertise surrounding the 
methods of risk assessment may hide a more mundane reality: that is, ‘risk calculations 
and predictions are in fact often carried out by non-scientific personnel using very subjec-
tive tools’ (Moore and Valverde 2000: 521).  
In the accounts of the Rice case, a range of failings can be identified to substantiate 
challenges to the representation of risk assessment/management as inevitably expert, 
actuarial and deterministic. For example, the Inspectorate’s Report reveals that risk as-
sessments were conducted by the Prison Service in the absence of Rice’s full criminal 
record (which was easily accessible on the Police National Computer system); the rec-
ommended use of the structured risk assessment tool, Offender Assessment System 
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(OASys),2 never occurred prior to his release with the result that Rice (a ‘high risk’ of-
fender) was permitted to reside in a hostel with inadequate security arrangements; and the 
personnel attending MAPPA meetings supervised Rice’s management plan without hav-
ing full knowledge of, or attempting to monitor, key risk factors (such as his alcohol us-
age).  
Poor communication and resource limits were recognised by the Inspectorate as key 
factors in the overall failure in the risk management of Rice. However, what is also plainly 
confirmed in this case is the subjective and arbitrary use of the two main risk tools: 
OASys and Risk Matrix 2000.3 Moreover, where risk information was available, the extent 
to which it was actually relied upon in the practices of prison, probation and police per-
sonnel was also found to be very variable. For example, the police completed a Risk Ma-
trix 2000 assessment which took account of Rice’s sexual offending but failed to take 
account of his violent offending;  information which would have raised his status from 
‘high’ to ‘very high risk.’ There was also no record of this assessment actually being 
shared with the MAPPA meeting as required by protocol. Perhaps more significantly, the 
Rice case confirms research which has indicated that approximately 70 per cent of OASys 
assessments may be incomplete or not completed properly by probation staff (Kemshall 
et al. 2005: 17). For example, Rice’s supervising probation officer never updated the origi-
nal OASys assessment (which would have required re-inputting the data) with the result 
that Rice’s management plan was based on incomplete information. The influence of 
socio-cultural and organisational factors may, therefore, be the key to understanding the 
exact nature and effectiveness of a particular risk technology. Confirmation of this can be 
found in a BBC radio documentary on the working of MAPPA and the use of  OASys. 
When asked whether computer software was the reason for incomplete OASys assess-
ments, Mike McLelland (the leader of the Probation Officers’ national union, NAPO) 
replied:  
My criticism of it would be that it’s too long, it’s too unwieldy, it’s difficult to use. At the mo-
ment it’s an electronic document, if you print it off, depending on how much you’ve written in 
it, you’re going to get the document that’s somewhere between 35 and 42 pages long. It’s only 
when you finish the first thirteen sections that you get into the risk of harm screening and then 
the full risk of assessment and I think to be perfectly fair, by the time people have got through 
thirteen sections they’re just getting a little jaded with this tool that they’re having to fill in. I 
think there’s still a considerable degree of resistance to using it (BBC 2006: 11). 
Yet, even if an OASys assessment is complete and accurate, the extent to which it actually 
forms part of the MAPPA decision-making process needs also to be scrutinised. As the 
Inspectorate’s Report indicates, the minutes of the Hampshire MAPPA meeting held to 
 
 
2  OASys is used by the Probation and Prison Services, and is designed to identify previous 
patterns of behaviour and warning signs, to assess the risk of harm, and to highlight the pro-
tective factors which could reduce the risk posed. 
3  Risk Matrix 2000 is used by the Police Service in England and Wales and is designed to assess 
violent and sex offenders.  
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discuss Anthony Rice’s management plan are ‘brief, and provide little evidence of a de-
tailed and structured risk assessment’:  
On 23rd November a MAPPA meeting was held. The OASys completed by London had arrived 
in Hampshire since the previous meeting and was in the Probation file. This assessment could 
have made a valuable contribution to the MAPPA meeting’s understanding of Anthony Rice, 
but we can find no evidence that the MAPPA received or made use of it (2006: 39-40).  
In conclusion, the importance of unpacking the social construction of risk is clearly dem-
onstrated by the sequence of failures in the assessment and management of Anthony 
Rice. Also, even if there were some exceptional factors in this particular case (such as the 
then-ongoing shift from handwritten to electronic information systems), assumptions 
about the central and determinative role of risk technologies in serious sex offender man-
agement need to be treated with caution. Theoretical and empirical scrutiny is needed of 
the precise role and effects of different risk tools, and of the actual usage of risk knowl-
edges by different criminal justice actors. In addition, placing the emphasis on social con-
structionist accounts of risk will more accurately capture the wider political implications 
of serious sex offender management where, for example, the organisational consequences 
of a particular risk classification (‘high risk’ rather than ‘medium risk’ offenders) can be 
very undesirable in terms of the increased workloads placed on personnel and the alloca-
tion of limited resources (Kemshall and Maguire 2001: 250). 
How Organisations Frame Questions of Risk and Rights Compliance 
The second issue on which the Rice case throws very interesting light is how criminal 
justice organisations attempt to comply with different risk-based and rights-based obliga-
tions or expectations. In the UK, risk compliance is a particularly complex question as 
public administration is increasingly organised and regulated around the concept of ‘or-
ganisational risk’ (Hutter 2006; Hood et al. 2004; Fisher 2003). This has resulted in a range 
of internal and external actors (especially the UK Treasury) monitoring how organisations 
assess and manage their own ‘business risk register’, with potential risks categorised under 
general headings such as operational, financial, reputational or legal risk. 
The National Probation Service Circular PC02/2007, Risk Management Standard For-
mat is an example of the type of documentation and terminology now used in the criminal 
justice sector. It places the onus on managers to monitor organisational risk in the follow-
ing terms: 
Organisations are increasingly being required to demonstrate effective corporate governance and 
internal control. At the same time there is also a primary objective to deliver performance. As we 
deal with risks on a daily basis, it is very important that the arrangements and processes for man-
aging risk are well understood. For example the following types of action can be taken to re-
spond to risk situation[s] on a daily basis: Transfer some aspect of the risk; Tolerate the risk; 
Treat the risk; Terminate the risk. All probation areas are expected to address risk issues be-
cause identifying the sources of risk and the area of impact on the business of the organisation 
will contribute to the effective management of the risk (2007: 2). 
The Circular goes on to create a scale for identifying the likelihood of risks, ranging from 
‘very low’ (less than 5% chance of occurrence) to ‘very high’ (more than 80% chance). It 
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then provides guidance on assessing the impact of particular occurrences at different 
organisational levels under the headings of: public protection (exposing the public to injury 
or loss of life); financial (overspends from under £2 million to over £25 million); reputation 
(from public criticism up to ministerial resignation); and  delivery (failure to achieve objec-
tives). Templates of risk registers are also included in the Circular, along with very basic 
notes on how to complete each section. Of course, the crucial question is whether – and, 
if so, how – this general guidance to all ‘business risk managers’ in the Probation Service 
translates into day-to-day decisions and practices. Practically nothing is known about this 
aspect of governance due both to the absence of published empirical research and, one 
can assume, particular sensitivity about the political (and, in some instances, legal) impli-
cations of detailed revelations.  
Allied with this new focus on organisational risk in the public sector, the functional 
roles of traditional criminal justice actors – such as the Parole Board – have also been 
redefined by their increasing reliance on new technologies of individual risk assessment 
and management. There is an ongoing shift from the use of professional clinical diagnosis 
towards an increased role for actuarial risk tools when predicting the risk of (re-)offending 
or endangering public safety. This is being reinforced by the increasing number of statutes 
and administrative practices foregrounding ‘risk of harm’ tests within the UK criminal 
justice and welfare systems (Kemshall 2003).4  
In the specific context of sex offender management, these different risk-based obli-
gations mean that a range of organisations (parole boards, police forces, prison and pro-
bation services, housing authorities, etc) are now closely connected in a network of risk 
compliance under MAPPA. Each organisation is expected both to satisfy a range of legal 
obligations to protect public safety and to comply with public sector governance rules to 
manage its own ‘risk register’. These tasks require organisations to take account of both 
traditional legal rules (statutes, caselaw) and an increasing range of non-legal rules and 
standards (Treasury guidelines, Ministry of Justice circulars, etc) (Fisher 2003). The em-
phasis is placed on constant assessing, managing and monitoring of a range of potential 
risks – and assumes, in each context, that the relevant risk knowledge (psychiatric, legal, 
financial, etc) is both available and accurate. Effective risk management also places a 
heavy emphasis on ‘defensibility’: that is, ensuring adequate lines of responsibility/blame 
in the event of an undesirable outcome. Not surprisingly, in the field of serious sex of-
fender management, the degree of organisational exposure to potential risks – due to the 
threat to public safety, the history of media coverage and political fallout (Bell 2002) – is 
very high.  
The second main type of regulatory demand that needs to be considered is the 
rights-based one. All public sector organisations (and private companies who perform a 
‘public function’ such as prison management) must comply with the provisions of the 
HRA 1998. In theory, this means that each ‘public authority’ in the UK must fulfil the 
legal obligation to respect ECHR rights in the performance of its duties (Lester and Pan-
 
 
4  The most conspicuous evidence of this is Scotland’s Risk Management Authority, which has 
the statutory purpose of ‘ensuring the effective assessment and minimisation of risk’ (see 
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003). 
Risk, Human Rights and the Management of a Serious Sex Offender 207 
 
 
nick 2004). However, what this means in practice remains largely unexplored as there is 
very little empirical legal scholarship on the impact of human rights in the UK. Neither 
the initiation of rights claims nor the implementation of rights norms has been much 
studied (Halliday and Schmidt 2004). The information that is available on public sector 
responses to the HRA 1998 portrays a mixed picture. It shows variable patterns of legal 
knowledge, political commitment, exercise of professional judgment, allocation of re-
quired resources and fear of sanction within public authorities (Clements and Thomas 
2005). Furthermore, where there is an official organisational response to the HRA 1998, 
‘defensive compliance’ may be prioritised, rather than proactively seeking to use rights as 
a normative source in policy and decision-making processes. 
When one focuses on the specific contexts of prisoner release and offender man-
agement, as in the Rice case, some further distinctions must be made between organisa-
tional responses to the HRA 1998. This is because the legal roles of the Parole Board and 
of the organisations involved in MAPPA (such as police and probation services) are for-
mally and substantively very different. While ECHR caselaw has been the decisive influ-
ence on UK statutory reforms which have expanded the role and procedures of the Pa-
role Board (for example, all prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment now have a right to 
legal representation in hearings), there is no evidence to indicate that the practices of 
organisations involved in MAPPA have been affected by human rights law (or rights 
consciousness) to any similar extent (Kemshall et al. 2005). 
In light of the above discussion on how organisations frame their risk-based and 
rights-based obligations, the factual details in the Inspectorate’s Report on the decisions, 
actions and failures in the management of Anthony Rice are revealing. For example, from 
an organisational risk perspective, one would have expected to find clear evidence in the 
monitoring of Rice (a ‘high risk’ offender) to support Sparks’ general observation that 
‘[s]ometimes the political risks become so large that almost any risk-taking by [criminal 
justice] practitioners comes to seem unaffordably foolhardy’ (2000: 131). Yet, the very 
opposite seems the case. In particular, the decisions and actions taken in relation to Rice’s 
supervision after release (for example, never questioning the security arrangements in the 
hostel or challenging his known alcohol usage) betray no heightened risk consciousness 
on the part of the relevant MAPPA actors. Other reasons, of course, may explain this. 
For example, the high numbers of offenders subject to probation and MAPPA supervi-
sion, and the related lack of necessary personnel and resources, may mean that ‘manage-
ment’ of (even ‘very high risk’) individuals is often a cursory process.5 Kemshall has high-
lighted the police perception that MAPPA can absorb disproportionate resources, does 
not reduce offending propensity and is unpopular with the public (2003: 98). Another key 
reason may be the apparent absence of effective communication between different (hier-
archal) criminal justice organisations, despite the ‘inter-agency’ structure of MAPPA. 
Indeed, misunderstanding, lack of communication and blurred lines of responsibility, as 
evident from the Inspectorate’s comments on the flawed choice of accommodation for 
Rice, may be a consequence of the MAPPA framework:  
 
 
5  There are approximately 2,000 serious offenders living in 101 hostels in England and Wales.  
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Probation staff and police believed that Elderfield [hostel] would physically check that Anthony 
Rice was in the hostel during his curfew time … However, this hostel did not have the necessary 
security systems to allow them to do so. Elderfield staff, for their part, assumed that their sys-
tems were understood, as they had accommodated other high risk offenders in the past (2006: 
41). 
Two general conclusions on organisational risk management can be drawn from the In-
spectorate’s Report. First, in analysing the extent of organisational risk compliance by 
individual MAPPA actors, it may be difficult to identify the exact nature of governing 
relationships amongst the range of organisations and personnel. Furthermore, despite all 
the official documentation and rhetoric surrounding internal and external audits of risk 
compliance, the key question to be answered remains: have government departments and 
public sector organisations actually bought into risk based initiatives and, if so, to what 
extent (Hutter 2006: 220)? In the context of MAPPA, analysis is further complicated by 
the fact that actors’ ‘management’ of organisational risks (such as public protection or 
reputation) can be closely connected to, and even determined by, individual offender risk 
management. Yet contemporary police supervision, for example, even for those classed at 
‘high risk’ of re-offending can be minimal. As one police officer in an area of Northern 
England revealed to a journalist: ‘[b]eing considered high risk sounds serious, doesn’t it? 
In reality, it means I spend an hour in his flat every three to six months chatting to him 
about what he’s been up to’ (Observer, 7 January 2007).   
Secondly, as Kemshall and Maguire noted in an earlier study of MAPPA (2001: 253), 
and as the general reluctance of probation officers to use the OASys tool suggests, the 
actual practice of offender risk assessment can be crude, partial and technologically-
unsophisticated. The construction of risk may also not depend on a single distinct knowl-
edge base but, more typically, combine some mixture of actuarial, clinical, professional 
and common sense views. There is also no guarantee, as the Rice case demonstrates, that 
risk management personnel will always avail of, and act upon, the risk information that 
has been collected. Black’s general observation that in the current climate the ‘rhetoric of 
“risk management” and “risk-based” approaches combines a sense of strategy and control 
in a way which is politically compelling’, may thus be entirely accurate (2005: 19). 
The Diversity of Understandings and Representations of Human Rights  
Turning now to an analysis of the Rice case from a human rights-based perspective, some 
interesting questions are raised about both the practical and symbolic impact of the HRA 
1998. In the Inspectorate’s Report, there are repeated references to the challenges posed 
by ‘human rights considerations’ and lawyers; in particular, the alleged negative impact of 
these legal forces on the commitment to public protection: 
At an oral hearing of a panel of the Parole Board the prisoner will have, as Anthony Rice had in 
2004, counsel to represent him. The staff representing the Secretary of State, and the Parole 
Board members, have to apply themselves to testing ‘whether the Lifer’s level of risk to the life 
and limb of others is considered to be more than minimal.’ In this context it is a challenging task 
for people who are charged with managing offenders effectively to ensure that public protection 
considerations are not undermined by the human rights considerations (2006: 57). 
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Other references in the Report state that ‘an increasing focus on [Rice’s] human rights 
rather than public protection’ developed when he was being held in open prison prior to 
his release (2006: 72); and that MAPPA meetings faced potential legal challenges from 
Rice’s solicitor on the grounds that the original licence conditions (curfew hours, a geo-
graphical containment zone, no alcohol usage nor contact with lone females) ‘contra-
vened [Rice’s] human rights’ (2006: 63).  
The question raised by this criticism is whether MAPPA personnel did believe that 
‘human rights’ could ‘trump’ public protection concerns in the ways outlined. The Inspec-
torate’s Report supports this interpretation by asserting that the conduct of risk assess-
ments, and the appropriate management of Rice, were hampered by an overriding atten-
tion to human rights. One explicit example is the statement that ‘we find it regrettable 
that attention to effectiveness and enforceability [of Rice’s release conditions] was un-
dermined by the attention devoted to issues of lawfulness and proportionality’ (2006: 37). 
If this claim is correct, however, it would have a significance far beyond the immediate 
search for the failings in Rice’s supervision. Contrary to literature which emphasises 
dominant risk control models in the field of criminal justice, it would provide concrete 
evidence that human rights (law) can play a normative role in the calculations of risk man-
agement (Zedner 2006). Worryingly, however, despite its reference to the text of the 
ECHR Article 8 right to privacy, the Inspectorate’s account suggests that the proper 
application of human rights law (e.g., the proportionality test) required a lesser regard for 
public protection.6 In other words, a stark dichotomy, rather than a balance, was con-
structed between risk (of harm) and rights discourses.  
The core problem, however, with the Inspectorate’s representation of human rights 
is that there is no evidence provided in the Report to substantiate the claims made. This is 
confirmed by the UK Parliament Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR), which 
published its findings on the Rice case in November 2006. It concluded that a series of 
errors and misjudgements led to the cumulative failure in the case, but it was unable to 
find ‘any concrete evidence in the Report itself that any decision concerning the release or 
management of Anthony Rice was affected in any way by human rights considerations 
being given precedence over public protection’ (JCHR 2006: 14). For example, the Parole 
Board might have reached a different decision on release if the information on Rice’s 
previous convictions had not been withheld from it. Similarly, it was lack of information 
and misunderstandings which led MAPPA actors to select the wrong hostel for Rice, and 
then inadequately supervise him when in the community. Intriguingly, when asked to 
supply evidence to explain why the Report blamed human rights for the failures in the 
case, the Inspectorate submitted a letter to the JCHR containing two admissions. First, it 
stated that it ‘was a huge distortion of our findings when some newspapers said that Rice 
was released in order to “meet his human rights”’. Secondly, it described the rights 
awareness amongst probation staff as having a ‘distracting’ effect and operating in ‘subtle’ 
ways:    
 
 
6  Article 8(1) of the ECHR states that everyone has a right to privacy. Article 8(2), however, 
permits the lawful and proportionate interference with this right on several grounds including 
public safety, prevention of crime and the protection of the rights of others.   
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Such staff have perhaps three or more dozen cases to manage, all different, with managers (and 
yes, Inspectors) ready to criticise them if they do the wrong thing with any of those cases at 
various key points. They do not have a very high status within the whole process …. What we 
found in the Rice case was a lot of evidence of the case manager, and the MAPPA meetings, giv-
ing plenty of careful consideration to the issues of treating Rice fairly, and responding accord-
ingly to the solicitor’s letters. Usually (but not always, unfortunately) they took the correct view 
and maintained the  restrictions that Rice and his solicitor were complaining about. All this dis-
cussion of issues of fairness was all quite well documented. What we then did not find in the re-
cords was evidence of sufficient discussion of their continuing assessment and management of 
Rice’s Risk of Harm to others (JCHR 2006: Ev 22). 
Three general conclusions on rights discourse, I would argue, can be drawn from the Rice 
case. First, it needs to be recognised that rights can be fluid and indeterminate, and the 
meaning of the HRA 1998 will be the subject of ongoing contestation by different con-
stituencies (Whitty et al. 2001). An example of this phenomenon is the ease with which 
‘human rights’ was constructed as the obstacle to effective risk management in the media 
coverage of the Naomi Bryant murder, and also skilfully used by politicians as camouflage 
for the administrative failings (and known limitations) within MAPPA.7 It is also notewor-
thy that, despite the clearly-identified failures of risk-based practices, no similar ground-
swell of criticism developed against risk expertise. Perhaps ironically, the HRA 1998 has 
taken yet another twist in the context of the Rice case: Liberty, a leading human rights 
NGO, is now acting for Naomi Bryant’s mother in a legal action alleging that her daugh-
ter’s ECHR Article 2 right to life was violated. 
Secondly, in order to understand more fully how the different organisations and ac-
tors work together under MAPPA, and how risk and rights discourses relate, the ‘dynam-
ics of knowledge production and circulation’ require close scrutiny (Valverde et al. 2005: 
87). For example, questions need to be asked about which actors use particular knowl-
edges or combinations of knowledges; when and where these knowledges are used; and 
with what ‘legal, social and epistemological effects’ (2005: 87). It would be very useful to 
know, for example, the exact nature and extent of human rights (law) knowledge held by 
the different MAPPA actors involved in the Rice case. Especially when, as the UK case 
law on prisoner challenges to parole board decisions clearly demonstrates, there is a long-
standing judicial reluctance to become involved in adjudicating on ‘expert’ risk manage-
ment of offenders. Whether risk knowledge is legal or non-legal, expert or everyday, or a 
hybrid of these, will also be an important question to explore. As Valverde et al. (2005: 87) 
have argued, although the ‘literature on risk and law tends to counterpoise expert knowl-
edge to law and legal reasoning’, it is more ‘useful to not assume that everything that goes 
in as “expert witness testimony” is epistemologically homogenous (“science” or “exper-
tise”)’. The relationships between risk knowledges and rights knowledges also require 
scrutiny. In the Rice case, for example, the JCHR Report places emphasis on an under-
standing of public protection (risk of harm) as an integral part of the HRA 1998 framework 
 
 
7  See also the political and media linkage of the increase in legal aid for legal representation of 
prisoners at parole boards (from 425 cases in 2001-02 to 1500 in 2005-06) with the events of 
the Rice case: ‘Legal Aid Bill for Parole Board Challenges Tops £2m’ (Guardian, 20 May 2006).   
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(rights). In contrast, the Inspectorate places emphasis on the alleged potential for legal 
knowledge and processes to ‘challenge’ risk management:  ‘[a]t the point of an oral Parole 
hearing, as an officer if you are not proposing release you will be cross-examined by a 
barrister to challenge your assessment, as well as by the Board, but if you are proposing 
release you will only be questioned by the Board’ (JCHR 2006: Ev 22).  
Thirdly, and finally, it needs to be emphasised that wider socio-cultural representa-
tions and understandings of ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ rights-holders will be particu-
larly powerful in the context of serious sex offender management,  especially where child 
victims are involved. Thus, although the ECHR has played an influential role in helping 
UK government ministers and police forces to preserve the privacy rights of ‘paedophiles’ 
– and resist sustained media and public campaigns for US-style open sex offender regis-
ters (Hood et al. 2004: 142) – the commitment to individual rights protection in everyday 
practice may be different. As Kemshall and Maguire revealed in their research on MAP-
PA, there is an accepted devaluing of the legal rights of some (suspect) offenders:    
The notion of offenders’ rights took low priority in the thinking of [public protection] panel 
members; concern was rarely expressed about possible violations of rights to privacy, or of the 
fundamental distinction between those who are under statutory supervision or control (e.g. on 
probation or conditional release licence) and those who are not (including those merely sus-
pected of offending). Similarly, although police officers recognized that they had no right to en-
ter the homes even of registered sex offenders, they often deliberately gave them the impression 
that they did have such rights (2001: 254).  
Conclusion 
This analysis of the Rice case aims to counter one-dimensional claims about risk and 
rights. On the face of it, the case appears to be about dichotomous discourses. However, 
as highlighted above, the construction, use and representation of different risk knowl-
edges and rights knowledges (by probation officers, the Inspectorate, the JCHR and oth-
ers), as well as the ways in which these were politicised, indicate a much more complex 
landscape. My focus on serious sex offenders and the inter-agency structure of MAPPA 
indicates that there is no uniform quality to risk assessment and management practices 
(O’Malley 2004). It is also apparent, though, that we know very little about how UK pub-
lic sector organisations are ‘managing’ different risk-based and rights-based obligations 
and goals. The political controversy over ‘human rights’ in the Rice case reveals the extent 
to which the HRA 1998 can have both practical and symbolic effects on risk assessment 
and management. The exact nature, extent and consequences of this relationship between 
risk and rights remains to be addressed in future legal and criminological scholarship.  
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